India-China: the inability to define a border

Background

• The India-China border dispute is rooted in differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

• Lack of a mutually agreed and clearly demarcated border has led to frequent tensions and face-offs.

Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 Visit and Aftermath

• Marked a thaw in India-China relations after decades of tension post-1962 war.

• Led to the establishment of a Joint Working Group (JWG) to discuss the boundary issue.

• 6 rounds of JWG talks held between 1988 and 1993.

Political Context (Late 80s – Early 90s)

• Domestic political instability in India (1989–1991) delayed substantive progress.

• P.V. Narasimha Rao government (1991–1996) revived focus on foreign relations, including China.

Early Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

• 1992: Resumption of border trade after 30+ years.

• 1992: Reopening of consulates in Mumbai and Shanghai.

• Military commanders’ meetings agreed at Bum La and Chushul/Moldo points.

• 1992: Defence Minister Sharad Pawar’s visit — First ever Indian Defence Minister to visit China.

1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA)

• Signed during PM Narasimha Rao’s visit to Beijing (Sept 6, 1993).

• First formal reference to LAC in a bilateral document.

• Aimed to maintain peace and tranquillity pending final resolution of the boundary.

Key Provisions of BPTA

1. Peaceful resolution of the boundary question.

2. Non-use of force by either side.

3. Adherence to LAC; mutual withdrawal in case of overstepping.

4. Joint verification in disputed segments of the LAC.

5. Reduction of forces along LAC on basis of mutual and equal security.

6. Take into account geographical limitations (India’s tougher terrain vs China’s infrastructure).

1996 Agreement on CBMs

• Signed during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to India.

• Expanded upon BPTA, reinforcing military CBMs.

Key Provisions

• Reiterated commitment to peaceful resolution and respect for LAC.

• Agreement to limit military forces (including tanks, artillery, missiles) near LAC.

• Ban on large-scale military exercises near LAC or direct them away from the border.

• Article X: Called for exchange of maps and clarification of LAC alignment.

Failures in LAC Clarification

• 2000: Maps exchanged only for the relatively undisputed Central Sector.

• 2002: Exchange of maps for Western Sector failed — both sides returned maps in 20 mins.

  • Maps reflected maximalist positions on both sides.

• By 2005: Process of LAC clarification was abandoned.

Key Points of Disagreement (Western Sector):

• Samar Langpa

• Trig Heights

• Depsang

• Kong Ka La

• Pangong Tso

• Spanggur Gap

• Mount Sajun

• Dumchele

• Demchok

• Chumar

Implications of Undefined LAC

• Persistent face-offs due to differing perceptions.

• E.g., 2020 Galwan clash violated 1996 CBMs (esp. Article IV on military exercises).

• Absence of agreed LAC = no mechanism to verify overstepping.

Analysis

• The swap deal (Aksai Chin for Tawang) was taken off the table early, limiting options.

• Agreements focused more on freezing the situation rather than resolving it.

• Both sides have shown inability or unwillingness to:

  • Define the LAC jointly.

  • Implement CBMs effectively.

Conclusion

• Peace is not possible without a mutually recognised border.

• While early efforts (1988–1996) were promising, lack of follow-through on LAC clarification and map exchange has left the issue unresolved.

• Result: Recurring tensions, especially in disputed areas, with rising stakes in recent years.

Related Posts

Defence Exports

Posted on April 9, 2024

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Posted on January 26, 2023

PM Vishwakarma Scheme

Posted on September 19, 2023