Awful silence: On India-China standoff 

#GS2 #International 

Nearly a month after the first skirmishes(small fights) on the LAC between Indian and Chinese soldiers were reported, the situation on the ground still appears to be tense. 

While there has been no official explanation of what has happened there since May 5, the day the first clash at Pangong Tso (lake) was reported, there is enough information to conclude that this is the most serious such standoff India and China have seen in years. 

India-China Stand-offs 
Relevant India-China Treaties and Agreements 
•1,914 Simla Convention (McMahon Line) 
agreement on Peace and Tranquility on the Line of Actual Control 
•1,496 agreement on Confidence 811iIding Measures in the Militarv field 
•2CIC15 agreement on Settlement of the 8011ndalM/ Oilestion 
•2C112Agreement on Working Mechanism for Consultation G Coordination 
•01118 Border Clefence Cooperation Agreement 
Aksai 
2018: 
2014: Chumar, 
Oldi, Ladakh sector 
Ladakh sector 
201B: Demchok 
Ladakh sector 
China 
(Tibet) 
India 
Delhi 
GATEWAY 
HOUSE 
201B: Tawang district, 
Arunachal Pradesh 
201B: Anjaw district, 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Relevant India-Bhutan Treaties and Agreements 
India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty 
•2CICIT India-8h11tan Friendshi Treat ) 
Relevant India-China Treaties and Agreements 
•18,911 Anglo-rehina agreement on Sikkim and Tibet 
•1,914 Simla Convention 
•1,954 Panchsh881 Treaty 
agreement on Peace and Tranquility on the Line of Actual 
Control 
•1,496 agreement on Confidence 811iIding Measures in the Militarv 
field 
•2CIC15 agreement on Settlement of the 8011ndalM/ 01188tion 
•2C112Agreement on Working Mechanism for Consultation G 
Coordination 
•21113 Border Clefence Cooperation Agreement 
Relevant China-Bhutan Treaties and Agreements 
•1,988 Guiding Principles on the 8011ndalM/ Issues 
•1,498 agreement on Maintenance of Peace G Tranquilit 
2017' Doklam (called Donglang by China), at the tri-junction of 
Bhutan, India, and China 
Bhuta 
Infographic by Sameer Patil and KaMik daishankar

TALKS- ONLY SOLUTION: 

  • As reported by The Hindu, sources say that the number of Chinese soldiers, the aggression with which they have dealt with Indian soldiers, as well as the number of points of conflict, indicate strategised action by Chinese commanders. 
  • While both governments have been careful to keep the tone of their comments sober, the fact that both sides have repeatedly mentioned that talks are on is also proof of an ongoing situation. 
  • A full de-escalation(reduction of the intensity of a conflict) will entail(require) soldiers being able to return to their normal LAC patrols. 
  • Military officers say it will probably need a high-level political intervention and for the Indian side, an insistence that Chinese soldiers, who appear to have been the aggressors, returning to positions they previously held. 

INTERVENTIONS BY THE U.S: 

  • In the midst(middle) of these sensitive negotiations, the interventions by the U.S. come as inopportune(untimely) distractions. 
  • The first comment, last week, by a then senior State Department official accused China of being an aggressor on several fronts and posing a “threat” to its neighbours. 
  • It was then followed by President Trump’s offer, this week, to mediate between Delhi and Beijing. 
  • Neither comment appears to have been made in consultation with India. India has made it clear that it will not accept Mr. Trump’s offer and has denied his claim that he spoke to PM Modi on the issue. 

ENDING STANDOFF: 

  • The government’s first priority now must be to end the current standoff, and then for its senior officials to enter serious talks on LAC demarcation. 
  • Given all the new infrastructure being built by India, it may also be necessary to negotiate new border management protocols that were last updated in 2013. 
  • The government must also investigate how a big build-up of Chinese soldiers was not acted upon earlier. 
  • Beyond this, it must make a full assessment of just what China’s final aims are: 
  • Is the summer conflagration(fire) meant to deflect attention from Beijing’s current problems over the coronavirus pandemic;  
  • To deter(prevent) India from its infrastructural push for roads and bridges to connect its northern frontiers all the way to the Karakoram pass, or; 
  • To “remind” New Delhi of its geographical vulnerabilities as it contemplates a closer maritime relationship in the Indo-Pacific with the U.S.? 

CONCLUSION: 

  • In all three scenarios, the first steps for the government would be to publicly clarify the seriousness of the situation at the LAC, and to build consensus around its plans for a firm pushback and an assertion of its position along the disputed line. 
Print Friendly and PDF
blog comments powered by Disqus